



# Bargaining *for* Productivity

## National Report, POLAND

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## **Section 1.**

### **Literature review on collective bargaining and labour productivity**

#### **1. Introduction**

In case of Poland, there is very little, if virtually none, literature linking the subjects of collective bargaining and labour productivity. For that reason, the field embraced in the literature review that follows will be demarcated in a very liberal way, taking into account any works recently published which could potentially be of our interest and provide a productive contribution to comparative analysis.

#### **2. Background: weak collective bargaining, with no labour productivity on the agenda**

Since 1989, when the hybrid model of industrial relations started emerging, no coordinated productivity bargaining has been functioning in Poland. The absence of productivity bargaining from the 1990s onwards is a part of broader phenomena, namely deterioration of collective bargaining and fragmentation of industrial relations. Collective bargaining coverage in Poland is less than 15%, union density is barely 12% and employer organisations density slightly higher at 20% (Industrial Relations in Europe 2014). According to the National Labour Inspectorate (PIP), the content of collective agreements over the years has been successively trimmed down to the state, when single-employer agreements rarely include employee entitlements that could be regarded as privileges, and are usually limited to simple reprise of the generally binding regulations of labour law. So they are more a symbol of employers' propensity to engage in social dialogue at workplace level than a genuine autonomous regulation of employment relations.

Collective bargaining in Poland is extremely decentralized, with single-employer agreements prevailing over multi-employer ones. The most prominent (and consequential) feature of the system is the absence of sector-level bargaining. In 2014 there were only 86 active multi-employer collective agreements, covering some 390,000 employees, i.e. some 2.7 % of employees, mostly from the public sector, according to the Ministry of Labour data. Collective agreements can be seldom encountered in Polish

private enterprises, while they are more often present in public (and post-state owned) as well as foreign-owned private companies (Czarzasty 2014). Decline of collective bargaining has to some extent been compensated for by tripartite social dialogue. In 2013 trade unions decided to exit the national-level tripartite body, the Tripartite Commission for Social and Economic Affairs (Trójstronna Komisja do spraw Społeczno-Gospodarczych) in a protest against voluntarist policies of the government. The stalemate ended in the summer of 2015, when the new law on tripartite social dialogue was adopted. Tripartite Commission was replaced with the Social Dialogue Council (Rada Dialogu Społecznego, RDS), furnished with broader prerogatives than its predecessor.

At the end of 31 2014 r. in the register maintained by the Minister of Labour, there were:

- 174 multi-employer collective agreements,
- 333 additional protocols amending multi-employer collective agreements,
- 46 accords regarding application of multi-employer collective agreements in force in their entirety or partially;
- 9 additional protocols amending accords regarding application of multi-employer collective agreements in force.

Out of those 174 agreements, in 74 cases one of the signing parties has notified the Minister of Labour of cancellation or dissolution of the agreement, and further 14 agreements can only be described as ‘defunct’ (even though they are formally still in place), because the signing party on the employer side either does not exist anymore or has lost their legal capacity to be a party to a multi-employer agreement.

**Table 1:** Collective bargaining at glance

<b>Year</b>	<b>Single-employer collective agreements</b>	<b>Additional protocols amending single-employer collective agreements,</b>	<b>Accords regarding application of single-employer collective agreements in force in their entirety or partially</b>
<b>2000</b>	498	3646	56
<b>2001</b>	361	2796	11
<b>2002</b>	310	2432	17
<b>2003</b>	441	3087	25
<b>2004</b>	328	2193	21
<b>2005</b>	220	1792	12
<b>2006</b>	177	1646	6

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<b>2007</b>	168	1961	15
<b>2008</b>	155	1732	4
<b>2009</b>	123	1688	2
<b>2010</b>	130	1396	1
<b>2011</b>	136	1291	3
<b>2012</b>	92	1265	3
<b>2013</b>	109	1131	1
<b>2014</b>	88	1030	1

**Source:** National Labour Inspectorate (PIP)

Most importantly, collective agreements play very little role in wage determination in general, and, considering the absence of the sectoral level agreements, no wage coordination above the workplace level is in place.

As signalled above, collective bargaining erosion has been somewhat counterbalanced by tripartite social dialogue. In the context of productivity-related issues, the most relevant level of analysis in the tripartite institutional framework are the tripartite sectoral committees (trójstronne zespoły branżowe, TZB), responsible for industry-specific dialogue (which allows to see them as a substitute for missing sectoral collective bargaining). As of 2016, there are the 13 tripartite sectoral committees:

- 1) Tripartite Committee for the Energy Sector (Zespół Trójstronny ds. Branży Energetycznej);
- 2) Tripartite Committee for the Social Conditions of the Metallurgy Sector Restructuring (Zespół Trójstronny ds. Społecznych Warunków Restrukturyzacji Hutnictwa);
- 3) Tripartite Committee for Miners' Social Security (Zespół Trójstronny ds. Bezpieczeństwa Socjalnego Górników);
- 4) Tripartite Committee for Social and Economic Issues and the Restructuring Conditions of Sulphur Mining and Processing Industries (Zespół Trójstronny ds. Społeczno-Gospodarczych Restrukturyzacji Górnictwa i Przetwórstwa Siarki);
- 5) Tripartite Committee for Textile Industry (Zespół Trójstronny ds. Przemysłu Lekkiego);
- 6) Tripartite Committee for Social and Economic Issues and the Restructuring Conditions of Defence-Related Manufacturing (Zespół Trójstronny ds. Społeczno-Gospodarczych Warunków Restrukturyzacji Zakładów Przemysłowego Potencjału Obronnego);

- 7) Tripartite Committee for the Chemical Sector (Zespół Trójstronny ds. Branży Chemicznej);
- 8) Tripartite Committee for Fishery and Sailing (Zespół Trójstronny ds. Żeglugi i Rybołówstwa);
- 9) Tripartite Committee for Construction and Public Utilities (Zespół Trójstronny ds. Budownictwa i Gospodarki Komunalnej);
- 10) Tripartite Committee for Railways (Zespół Trójstronny ds. Kolejnictwa);
- 11) Tripartite Healthcare Committee (Zespół Trójstronny ds. Ochrony Zdrowia);
- 12) Tripartite Committee for the Brown Coal Mining Sector (Zespół Trójstronny ds. Branży Węgla Brunatnego);
- 13) Tripartite Committee for the Ship-Building Industry (Zespół Trójstronny ds. Przemysłu Stoczniewego).

The sectoral dimension of the tripartite social dialogue was historically first to emerge back in 1992 (prior to the establishment of the Tripartite Commission). The tripartite sectoral committees were successively established in the large industrial sectors undergoing restructuring in order to appease social tensions arising due to employment cuts entailed by restructuring. Having played an important role in maintaining of social peace in the 1990s and early 2000s, their position would gradually weaken after the 2004 EU-accession, mostly because the major part of restructuring had been already completed, and EU-imposed strict measures regarding public aid became binding.

## Section 2.

### Overview on labour productivity developments

Since 1990 labour productivity in Poland has been rising consistently, yet at a relatively slow pace. The arrival of the global recession did not leave any significant mark on the overall process. Still, taking into account labour productivity in terms of percentage of EU-28 total (PPS), Poland is located in the cluster of low-labour productivity countries in the EU, with only Latvia, Romania and Bulgaria ranking lower. The literature approaching the developmental gap between the EU-15 and the New Member States from the CEE from the ‘real convergence perspective’ offers various forecasts regarding the time necessary for closing of the income gap with the ‘old’ EU, yet there is a consensus the process will still take decades, or, in the most pessimistic scenario will never (in the time remaining until 2060, to be precise) be completed (Matkowski, Próchniak, Rapacki, 2013).

**Table 2:** Nominal labour productivity per hour worked. Percentage of EU28 total (based on million PPS), current prices


GEO/TIME	2000	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
European Union (28 countries)	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0
European Union (15 countries)	117,6	115,0	114,8	114,4	114,2	113,9	113,0	112,6	111,9	111,8	111,8	111,7
Germany	123,9	128,0	126,6	126,5	126,3	124,5	126,0	127,1	125,7	125,4	127,0	126,8
Spain	98,7	95,4	97,0	98,3	98,4	101,7	99,5	99,0	99,8	100,2	100,0	98,2
Italy	116,8	103,7	102,7	102,9	104,7	104,8	103,6	103,2	103,0	102,3	101,8	100,6
Netherlands	137,3	136,3	137,0	137,0	138,0	134,3	132,1	131,2	129,0	129,8	128,6	126,7
<b>Poland</b>	<b>44,1</b>	<b>48,5</b>	<b>48,1</b>	<b>49,1</b>	<b>49,3</b>	<b>52,2</b>	<b>55,9</b>	<b>57,9</b>	<b>59,0</b>	<b>58,9</b>	<b>58,8</b>	<b>59,2</b>
United Kingdom	119,4	120,3	119,7	116,2	114,2	111,3	105,9	102,9	101,2	99,9	99,4	100,8

**Source:** Eurostat, <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/refreshTableAction.do?tab=table&plugin=1&pcode=tesem160&language=en> (accessed 09.10.2016)




As the longitudinal data presented in the Table 2 prove, despite noticeable progress made since the turn of the century labour productivity in Poland is still low, and as of 2015 represents only 59% of the EU-28 average. It is over twice as low as in Germany and the Netherlands, over 40% lower than in Italy and the UK, and almost 40% lower than in Spain.

**Figure 1:** Unit labour costs and labour productivity in Poland 1996-2014



Source: OECD, [http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=PDBI\\_I4#](http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=PDBI_I4#), (accessed 19.10.2016)

Figure 1 presents annual changes in labour costs and labour productivity in Poland. In the late 1990s labour costs dynamics were decelerating rapidly and entered eventually the short-lived phase of real fall (2002-2004) in the immediate EU pre-accession period. For a brief period labour costs growth would regain momentum (2007-2008, in the latter year the increase was 8.9%), only to stabilize in the subsequent years of economic slowdown and recovery. On the other hand, labour productivity systematically improved, yet at a very uneven pace. The biggest year-to-year leap was observed in 1999 (at 8.8%).

**Figure 2:** Unit labour costs and labour productivity in Poland 1995-2014

Source: OECD, [http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=PDBI\\_I4#](http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=PDBI_I4#), (accessed 19.10.2016)

It could be seen in the Figure 2 that labour productivity in Poland been growing, albeit the pace is not impressive, especially when juxtaposed with the labour costs dynamics. The main reasons explaining actual behaviour of both variables between from 1990s until early 2010s are as follows, according to the literature.

### 1. Labour costs

Radical industrial restructuring of the early 1990s (the Balcerowicz Plan and its aftermath) brought significant employment cuts, rationalization of management in big, then mostly state-owned companies and early signs of technological modernization. Those factors contributing to reduction of labour costs would be offset by wage growth, progressing despite restrictive monetary policy of the government and successful stoppage of hyperinflation (1989-1990) followed by reduction of price growth to the reasonable level, which allowed denomination of PLN (new zloty was made equivalent to 10,000 old zlotys) on 1 January 1995. Throughout 1990s, with the influx of the baby boomers of the 1970s and early 1980s into the labour market, the labour market policy concentrated on the objective of ‘clearing the space’ therein for the newcomers by the means of pushing the elder part of the workforce (over 50 years of age) out of employment using various deactivating measures such as early retirement schemes but also relatively easy access to disability pensions. As a result the employment rate fell down considerably, yet the unemployment rate would remain high and it was not until 2015 that the level became one digit figure. Around 2004 the shift towards Active

Labour Market Policy (ALMP) began. At the same time a wave of outward migration to EU-15 countries started, resulting in almost 2 million people (mostly representing young brackets of the economic activity age) leaving the country in early post-accession years (2004-2008) with major destinations being the UK and Ireland, with smaller numbers heading to the Netherlands and Sweden (migration wave to Germany had actually occurred prior to the EU enlargement). The post-accession emigration seriously affected the supply side of the labour market, the effects being only partly sedated by inward migration from the post-Soviet area, with Ukraine as the major sources of labour migrants.

All in all, labour costs in Poland are still considerably lower than labour costs in the 'old EU'. As of 2015, the hourly labour cost would amount to 8.6 EUR, three times lower than EU-28 average, four times lower than in the Netherlands, nearly four times lower than in Germany, three and half times lower than in Italy, three times lower than in the UK, and two and half times lower than in Spain. Among the whole EU-28, only Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, and Romania display lower hourly labour costs rates (Eurostat 2016).

Despite claims on the part of the significant part of business community, wage taxation levels in Poland are not excessive, average tax wedge as of 2015 at 34.7% is slightly below the OECD average (35.9%) and much lower than in the rest the Visegrad cluster (Czech Republic – 42.7%, Hungary – 49%, and Slovakia – 41.3%) (OECD 2016).

## **2. Labour productivity**

After 1989 labour productivity began to grow, with the main reasons behind that process being technological change, skills improvement and specialization coupled with redundancies and the overall fall in the volume of employment in the national economy. In the first decade of transformation, economic growth occurred in the circumstances of only partial utilization of factors of production (capital and labour), yet the capacity in both areas was growing faster than their efficient utilization. Labour productivity was growing fast until the end of the decade, being arguable the main driver that lifted Poland's economy off the initial transformation recession, combined with much slower growth in the unit labour costs, which clearly meant labour productivity was growing at a faster rate than real wages (Rapacki 2002). In the 2000s labour productivity growth increased in Poland, in particular in the 2001-2005 and the 2006-2010 periods, the resulted of an expansionary growth process (van Ark, Chen, Jäger 2013). It is argued, however, that unlike in the Baltic States, growth in Poland (seen as a part of a larger East European cluster, 1996-2007 period covered) could be attributed more to the multi-factor productivity (MFP) dynamics than labour productivity growth. While the economic growth in Baltic states seems to be driven by labour and capital growth, in the other post-socialist countries of the region it is more the result of gains in efficiency or

technological catch-up (Giannini, Vitali 2014, 145). Even the arrival of global recession in 2008 did not produce disastrous effects both on economic growth and productivity growth in general, and labour productivity growth in particular in Poland. Poland, along other CEE countries still possess large and not yet fully utilized physical and human capital resources and considerable capacity for continuous growth in labour productivity by wider application of modern technologies and new organisational solutions (Matkowski, Próchniak, Rapacki, 2013). Sawicki (2016, 104) shares this point of view, concluding that “[d]espite the apparent significant improvement in the indicators since 1989, Poland has a long way to go before levelling with the richest countries in the European Union and the OECD”. Jarmołowicz and Knapińska (2014, 19) observe there is convergence in labour costs within the EU, adding that low labour productivity in the New Member States (of the CEE) is a legacy of several past decades (of the central command economy), and while improving dynamics of labour productivity is certainly an optimistic tendency, the reasons behind that raise some concerns. Whereas improvement of skills, labour specialization and technological modernization are definitely positive changes leading to increased labour productivity, redundancies and fall in employment (also contributing to labour productivity growth) are not assessed so well. Nițoi and Pochea (2016, 145) in their comparative analysis of productivity growth in the CEE observe that “productivity paths are very diverse across sectors and between countries”.

### **Section 3.**

## **Analysis of economic and legal policies on labour productivity**

After years of neglect, the issue of labour productivity has finally found some recognition in public policies. The current government produced the strategy paper called the *Strategy of Responsible Development* in early 2017. The document points out to obvious discontinuities of the developmental path which has been followed since 1989, yet, instead of dismissing the model in its entirety, it calls for adding new sources of power behind the economic growth: “the factors of economic growth dominant thus far, including low cost of work, influx of foreign investment, improved education, economic adjustments following the EU accession must be complemented by increased role in the economic processes of knowledge and technology, development and further expansion of Polish business entities, building a system of savings and enhancing quality of institutions and the way they function and interact with society. At the same time, in order to foster competitiveness of the country in a stable and durable way, it is necessary to devote more attention to inclusion in processes of development of all social groups and all territories” (SOR, 7). Nevertheless, the issue of labour productivity, besides being acknowledged as a serious impediment to further economic development, is not addressed in any specific way. In general terms, it is supposed to be solved by enhancing innovation capacity of the national economy, especially with launching of ‘intelligent reindustrialization’, focused on building up new industries based on digital technologies and modernizing ‘traditional’ sectors, which will subsequently move up the value chain. This is going to allow for replacing the model of industry driven by low labour costs with a more advanced one and lead to increase in the share of the high- and medium-high tech industrial output in industrial sales revenues from 32.7% in 2014 to 34% in 2020, and 40-45% by 2030 (SOR, 11). Poland belongs to the EU Member States above average industry contribution to GDP: in 2015 the share was 23.3% (17.3% for EU-28) Between 2005 and 2015 the annual growth rate of industrial output in Poland amounted to 4.9% (0.3% in EU-28), thus the focus on reindustrialization seems reasonable, not only because of the EU-level strategic emphasis put on the industrial renaissance of European economies.

Since 2014 The National Training Fund (Krajowy Fundusz Szkoleniowy, [KFS](#)) has been in operation. KFS is a special part of the Labour Fund dedicated to upgrading skills and qualifications of people in employment. Until the end of 2015 KFS focused

on people aged 45 and more, from 1 January 2015 it has been available to all. Employers can apply for co-financing of the costs of continuous vocational training (CVT) of their staff: 80% of the cost comes from KFS, while the remaining 20% is to be self-financed by the applicant. Micro-enterprises can receive full financing of the CVT costs. Total amount of KFS funding per employee cannot exceed 300% of the national average wage in a given year. Since its inception, KFS annual expenditure amounted to: 20 177,9 thousand PLN (2014), 154 461,3 thousand PLN (2015), and 182 384,5 thousand PLN (2016), respectively, while in 2017 its annual budget amounts to 199 588,0 thousand PLN.

In 2015 the former government of PO/PSL adopted a strategy paper called the “Industrial Policy Priorities 2015-2020+” (Priorytety polityki przemysłowej 2015-2020+), in which “low labour productivity” in industrial manufacturing (total of 22 sectors under NACE section C) was named as one of the “weaknesses” (within the SWOT matrix) of the national economy (Industrial Policy Priorities: 11). ‘Increasing investments enhancing efficiency of innovative and creative capacity’ is named as one of the strategic priorities for industrial manufacturing (Industrial Policy Priorities: 20). This policy document envisaged the role of social partners (and other stakeholders such as chambers of industry) in the following areas:

- 1) Assessing industrial sectors competitiveness and identification of barriers to development
- 2) Assessing effectiveness of the use available public support measures by entrepreneurs,
- 3) Identification of barriers to trade development.

**Table 3:** Indexes for monitoring of progress in industrial policy implementation

	Index	Index value		
		2013	2017	2020
1.	Industrial manufacturing share in GDP [%]	22	23	25
2.	Industry share in value added [%]	25	26	28
3.	R&D expenditure as a share of GDP [%] (of which the private sector’s contribution)	0,9 (2012) (min. 30)	1,3 (min. 40)	1,7 (min. 50)
4.	Employment in industrial manufacturing [mln]	2,8	No less than 2,8	No less than 2,8
<b>5.</b>	<b>Labour productivity [EUR/hour]</b>	<b>10,6</b>	<b>11,9</b>	<b>12,8</b>
6.	Value of export per capita (current prices) [EUR]	4026	5426	6476

**Source:** Industrial Policy Priorities: 32

## **Section 4.**

### **Institutional and content analysis on collective bargaining and labour productivity in 4 sectors**

As far as social dialogue and productivity-related issues on the agenda on the key tripartite bodies are concerned, the literature on industrial restructuring in the 2000s (the period before and the first years after the EU accession) should be mentioned, in particular, Gilejko (2003) and Gilejko (2006). The tripartite sectoral committees (TZB) are briefly discussed by Gardawski (2009).

However, the issues of productivity remained at the margins of specific debates: in the restructuring-related negotiations the main subject was virtually always employment and cushioning of redundancies triggered in pursuit of increasing productivity and boosting competitiveness of large state-controlled industrial operations and providers of the Services of General Interest (SGI). This was the case of so-called ‘strategic sectors’ (Gilejko 2003, 2006) such as coal-mining, steel, arms industry, power generation and supply, railway transport or postal and telecommunications services. For most of them, tripartite sectoral committees (TZB) were established at some point.

In September 2016, the Social Dialogue Council (RDS) passed the [Resolution no. 15](#) establishing the Provisional Task Team for the Strategy of Responsible Development within the RDS. The Team met [twice](#) until the present moment (March 2017). In October 2016, the social partners at the central level passed a bipartite [resolution no. 19](#), which established the Committee for Sectoral Dialogue in the Automotive Industry. The Committee has been reportedly inactive up to date.

As of unilateral initiatives of social partners, the [Industrial Policy Committee](#) of NSZZ “Solidarność” was established in 2012.

## **Part A.**

### **Large retail**

In the sector there is no formal collective bargaining, despite continuous pressure of trade unions on employers. Insufficient bargaining power (due to low unionisation) translates into lack of autonomous regulation of work and employment relations. In the case of German-based chain *Real* (part of the Metro Group) advanced negotiations on a single-employer collective agreement were cut short by the takeover of Polish Real stores by French network *Auchan* completed in 2015. Trade unions see the dangers of the growing pay pressure, which have thus resulted in acute shortages of labour, increasing use of atypical forms of work (including TAW) and growing presence of migrant workers, especially in the large metropolitan areas. Trade unions are anxious about the impact of automation on level of employment:

Automatization of work seems to be a problem, especially with regard to retail. Saturation of non-human working arrangements will bring reduction of jobs (Solidarity).

As of public policy impact on labour costs retail, the quite unexpected consequence of introduction of 500+ public welfare programme. Under the programme which was launched early 2016 a monthly benefit of 500 PLN (roughly 120 EUR) is available to parents with two or more children aged under 18 can for the second child and any further children. The benefit allows one of the parents to reduce their working hours or even quit employment, which has affected the labour supply in low-pay sectors, including retail. The result was a rapid wage growth, especially in the discounter subsector of retail.

Large retail was a scene of severe reduction in employment over the years. There was a huge slump in employment between 2007 and 2011: for example, among the leading retailers in Poland, volume of employees in Carrefour went down from 27,000 to 14,000. Since 2012, number of employees has begun to slowly rise, reaching the level of around 16,000 as of 2016. Those figures might be, however, misleading due to a growing importance of atypical forms of work, and, ongoing flexibilisation of work organization with multi-skilling (multi-tasking) playing the major part. In other words, productivity growth (or maintenance of current levels) is achieved due to intensification of work. In case of Carrefour and Tesco, the employment contracts in early 2010s were reportedly signed with no specified scope of responsibility, meaning the employee was to perform tasks ordered by their supervisors, so the cashiers, when not engaged in check-outs, were expected to get involved in other duties such as replenishment or cleaning.

On the other hand, there is a growing awareness among big employers in the sector of the shrinking supply of workforce. As a result, some signs of the human capital approach in the HRM policies of large retailers have become visible in the mid-2010s.



According to the representative of *Auchan*<sup>11</sup>, currently the preferred form of employment from the employer's point of view is non-fixed term contract, seen as a key method for attracting and retaining workforce.

Around 85% of our staff have non-fixed term contracts, the remaining 15% – fixed term contracts. And we try to avoid long running fixed term contracts, like for two or three years. If we find any such contracts still in place, we convert them into non-fixed term ones. (Auchan, employer rep.)

Despite this shift in the recruitment policy, it does not seem to be a sufficient solution to counterbalance the undersupply in the metropolitan areas (e.g. Warsaw or Tri-City of Gdańsk-Gdynia-Sopot) with unemployment rate near the 'natural' level. So the gaps need to be filled with temporary agency workers, mostly migrants from Ukraine. Trade unions in the chains are supposedly interested in the narrow, traditional scope of bargaining, primarily wages but, according to the board representative with no connection to labour productivity but rather with seniority-based approach.

They keep saying, 'People have been working at the same posts for many years, so they should be getting a seniority-bonus but they aren't'. To them it is the key factor, not what the people do. Whether they keep doing the same or moving up, developing, does not matter as much as the number of years they have been with the company. (Auchan, employer rep.)

However, the company does not neglect the importance of employee loyalty and has extended to Poland (since 2000) some of their employee incentive measures, including the stock options in the designated investment fund offered to staff with a long tenure with the company.

To become a co-owner of the company is a chance we offer to our employees. The programme also involves training courses aiming to transmit basic knowledge of finances, financial markets, and, more specifically, about the employee ownership concept. (Auchan, employer rep.)

Among motivational measures implemented, there are more conventional instruments such as bonuses, not only individual but also collective.

We do have a turnover-related bonus that is earned and awarded collectively: it is calculated on the year-to-year basis per store, so employees of that store participate in the extra revenue they have managed to make over the reference period. (Auchan, employer rep.)

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<sup>11</sup> We have no consent from the company, to disclose their name publicly yet.

At individual level productivity is also stimulated with such HRM instruments as employee performance assessment, mentoring programme, and so-called graduate programme (development of managerial staff, proficiency in English and/or French required).

The company also reaches out to the education system, being very advanced with the project of launching patronage classes in vocational schools. There is an open enrolment into such classes in Warsaw (in collaboration with the local government, responsible for the compulsory elementary and mid-level education) currently underway, and with the inauguration of the new school year (2017/2018) the response from the teenage population will be known. The new formula is based on dual-education approach, combining in-school lectures with on-site training. It needs to be stressed out, however, that no sector-related negotiations are conducted, even among the leading networks associated in the Polish Organisation of Retail and Distribution (Polska Organizacja Handlu i Dystrybucji, POHiD). What is happening (with regard to outreach to the education system) is rather an example of ‘uncoordinated coordination’ (by mimicking good practices implemented by the competitors).

## **Part B.**

### **Car industry**

In the Polish car industry (or automotive sector, to be precise), some 750 thousand workers are employed with further 600 thousand working in the supply chain. The sector is dominated by foreign capital. While trade unions are relatively strong in the sector comparing to the entire economy, the state of collective bargaining is not significantly better than in the other branches. No sectoral agreement exists, and no single-employer agreements are in place in the major manufacturers either. The labour productivity issues are dealt with unilaterally by employers or by the means of informal (ad-hoc) arrangements agreed upon by employers and unions at the workplace level.

Collective bargaining takes place in a few enterprises, one of the meaningful cases is Volkswagen Poznań, where there is a single-employer collective agreement. The enterprise (which comprises two production sites) is highly unionised (around 70% density) with all 7,000 members grouped in a single union (NSZZ “Solidarność”). The model of industrial relations is typical for VW in Poland (there is analogous situation in another VW-owned enterprise, VW Polkowice, an engine manufacturer): one, strong union which – in close cooperation with the employer – has assumed in practice a position similar to German *Betriebsrat*.

Furthermore, labour productivity issues are the subject of workplace level social dialogue. The following measure have been implemented in the area of employee reward: performance-related pay (split into individual and team segments). As for worker participation, the union officers oversee performance on the assembly lines and collect feedback from employees. In case of alerting signals (e.g. too fast a pace), unions officers<sup>2</sup> pass the information forward to managers with whom they are in regular contact, so the problem can be resolved (e.g. by addition of another workers to attend the specific takt time). The link can also be used to communicating other production-related issues, thus there is a room for employee-initiated innovative practices. Another facet of the joint (union/management) performance overseeing is re-allocation of workers, who due to impact of various physical as well as psychosocial factors (e.g. age, bodily limitations/disabilities, burn-out) experience trouble with carrying out their current tasks, so they can be consensually (in a triangle: the worker-

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<sup>2</sup> By virtue of trade unions legislation, at the establishment level, a union has a right to delegate its members to union work (they retain their salary and the right to return in the future to their posts held prior to becoming union officers), the number of officers to which the union is entitled is calculated against volume of members: one, when the union has less than 150 members (part-time, on the basis one hour per one member a month), one (full-time), when the union has between 150 and 500 members, two (full-time), when the union has over 500 up to 1,000 members, three, (full-time), when the union has over 1,000 up to 2,000 members, and one additional per each thousand of members entered (e.g. the 4<sup>th</sup> officer could be delegated already as the union absorbs its 2,001<sup>st</sup> member).

their direct supervisor-union) shifted to other duties. Large size of both production sites leaves a fairly vast room for manoeuvre in that regard. Such an approach is underpinned by the cornerstone of the personnel management policy in the enterprise, that is, 'life-time employment'. Initial vocational education (IVT) is also a field of concern for social dialogue. Unions cooperate with the management in developing the dual education model, with VW-patronage classes in two local vocational schools preparing future staff in the skills that are expected to be in demand in the coming years (the needs for the next five years are secured). Yet, looking further, there is already a consensus that – due to advancements in automatization (robotisation) of automotive manufacturing – the demand for certain skills will diminish, which must be reflected in class-profiling. For example, the assembly line fitters/fixers or metal casters will be less sought of, while a larger number of mechatronics technicians, hi-tec machinery operators will be needed. The core of the dual education system is to offer a job to anyone who graduates from the patronage classes. The number of graduates revolves between 70 and 80 per year and the employer's objective is to possibly retain them all. As a result, continuous adjustments need to be made with regard to forecasted demand for skills, which has been exemplified by reducing enrolment into the metal casting class. There are total of 230 students enrolled at the moment, studying in five profiles (mechatronics technician, operator of metal casting machinery, automobile electromechanic, industrial and precision automation mechanic and precision mechanic). All students receive on-site training, all have employment contracts (a special type: contract of employment for vocational training), all (except minors) sign up for the union. While each student can count on working for the enterprise, only some (outstanding students) are hired directly by VW, and the remaining are offered employment by the temporary work agency collaborating with the enterprise on regular basis with a prospect for being transferred to the company itself. The TAWs are not discriminated as far as wages are concerned. Besides the school exams, students are required to pass an external exam, developed by the *AHK Polen (Die Deutsch-Polnische Industrie- und Handelskammer* or German-Polish Chamber of Industry and Commerce), which follows the German examination standards. The aim is to formally validate knowledge and qualifications necessary to take a post in any VW site. Those who fail the exam, can, nevertheless, sign a contract with TAW, and once the exam is passed, get hired by VW. Outstanding students, on the other hand, can count on being allocated to more challenging tasks than assembly line, for instance, continuous flow control or quality control. For the experienced employees, there is a measure that provides for career planning, that is, individual development plan, usually drawn for two years ahead in collaboration between the employee and their direct supervisor with support of the HR department.

## **Part C.**

### **Hotels and catering**

Autonomous social dialogue in the HORECA sector is weak. We have managed to discuss the issues of labour productivity with a representative of the sectoral employer organisation. The following issues have been raised:

- there is an acute shortage of skilled workforce in the open labour market ready to take up employment without the need of preparatory on-site training, this is the most important concern for the sector;

Good workers are fleeing, to the European labour markets, to places where money is better [than here]. [...]

- the upcoming reform of vocational education, which is going to result in establishment of the new type of vocational school, oriented towards the model of dual-education is approached with hope and caution at the same time (the latter, due to the fact that numerous details of the new formula are not known to the public opinion yet).

HORECA is one of the very few sectors in the national economy, where the sectoral framework of qualifications has been already implemented. In parallel, the Sectoral Council for Competences in Tourism (*Rada ds. Kompetencji Sektora Turystyki*) has been launched (established in February 2017). The body is receiving EU funding until 2023. Its general objective is defined as overcoming skills-mismatch in the sector. This is to be achieved through drawing recommendations for new legislative measures (or revision of ones in place) in the area of education leading to its better adjustment to the demands of the sectoral labour market. Improvement in the situation of vulnerable groups (persons over 50 years; low-skilled persons). Specific types of actions to be implemented will include: integration-oriented cooperation between educational institutions and employers; naming particular areas of research concerning competences in tourism, with special focus on the needs of vulnerable groups and commissioning relevant research projects. Information of such needs and demands collected will be reflected in sectoral frameworks of qualifications, and qualifications themselves, disseminated to educational institutions and labour market institutions (employment agencies, local labour offices) with a view of improving efficiency in labour allocation and vocational counselling, and also passed to social partners. The project is led by the Union of Employers in Tourism Lewiatan in partnership with the Warsaw School of Economics (SGH) and the Institute of Tourism. Notably, even though the social dialogue component is highlighted in the project's description, trade unions are nearly

absent from the body (with the exception of the Polish Teachers' Union, ZNP), whose line-up consists of representatives of business, education, central and local government.

## **Part D. Healthcare**

Public healthcare system in Poland is widely seen as ineffective, which has been manifested by a robust growth in private healthcare services in recent years. According to public statistic, healthcare expenditure expressed as a GDP share amounted to 4.83% (public spending) and 2.01 (private expenditure) in 2011, whereas in 2012 the figures were 4.67%, and 2.05%, respectively. Although there is very little empirical data measuring the actual extent of employer-funded private healthcare, it is estimated that approximately every fifth employee is covered by some type of medical assistance (Workplace Health around the World, 2015).

As far as labour productivity is concerned, the key issue is arguably understaffing of healthcare facilities: in Poland there are only 2.2 practising doctors per 1 000 population, and 5.3 nurses per 1000 inhabitants (the OECD average is 3.3 and 9.1, as of 2013). Furthermore, unlike in the vast majority of OECD member states, where the relative numbers of doctors and nurses have grown since 2000, in Poland the volume of healthcare personnel in those two major occupational categories has been stagnant. The workforce is also of relatively advanced age: it is over 49 years for doctors (2015), and 48 years for nurses (2014).

Downsizing and structure flattening as the source of trouble: registrars gone, secretaries gone, their work has not vanished, it just needs to be taken over by medical staff, who, in return, has less time for patients (Trade Union of Nurses and Midwives)

The public health policies is pointed to as the factor impeding (or even undermining) the labour productivity, as employment cuts among the non-medical personnel lead to spreading of multitasking, hence increased workload on doctors and nurses.

### *Other channels for advancement of productivity agenda?*

The ultimate obstacle for establishing a viable discourse on labour productivity within the institutional framework of collective bargaining seems, however, the reluctance of business community towards autonomous regulation of employment relations. With virtually none significant developments in the field of collective bargaining, one can hardly expect the issues of labour productivity to be addressed in a bilateral talks between employers and employee parties. As the case of the retail network covered, there are examples of unilateral employers initiatives aiming at boosting the attachment

of employees to their current workplace (stock option plan) or expanding internal labour markets onto educational system (patronage classes)<sup>3</sup>.

To sum it up:

No collective agreements, 'no way': they say, no matter where they're from: Lewiatan, ZRP, BCC. Only negative experiences: no possibility to revoke collective agreements. And if there were to be extended to cover all the others, not just those who signed them... Businesspeople usually think like that: me and my people will always manage to get along, better or worse. But if outsiders get involved, they will impose standards we won't be able to keep up with. In the end, it is about the lack of trust. (Lewiatan)

With no visible capacity of social partners to improve autonomous social dialogue, there void needs apparently to be filled out by the state, thus some form of neo-etatism can emerge.

If business community is not able to control itself, to self-restrain, then the external control is necessary. (Lewiatan)

There is a chance that regional social dialogue bodies (wojewódzkie rady dialogu społecznego, WRDS) may be equipped with more prerogatives concerning the vocational training. Yet the results remain to be seen.

Recently, there has been pressure by trade unions on legislative process aiming at empowerment of social dialogue institutions (especially, regional ones) in the field of vocational training and development. (Forum)

As the example of the Sectoral Council for Competences in Tourism indicates, even in case of productivity-oriented social dialogue initiatives, involvement of employee representation is low. In other words, they can be characterised as manifestations of either 'enlightened paternalism' on the part of employers or 'neo-etatism', with state being a decisive stakeholder (directly and/or indirectly, in the latter case by channelling structural funds into prioritised fields of activity, in the case of tourism it is 'skills and qualifications').

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<sup>3</sup> The case of patronage classes is an interesting example of institutional imitations (or intra-sectoral learning by best practice), as the chain in focus is not the only one exploring such opportunities.



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## Statistical Annex.

### Labour productivity

nace_r2	Year	Total employment (thousands, domestic concept)	<b>Total employment, change (y/y)</b>	Real GDP (millions of NCU)	Labour productivity (GDP/EMP)	Total hours worked (thousands, domestic concept)	Total hours worked of employees (thousands, domestic concept)	<b>Labour productivity growth (y/y)</b>	Hourly labour productivity (GDP/Total hours worked)	<b>Hourly labour productivity growth(y/y)</b>
Total	2000	14 517	:	864 478	59,6	30 219 168	21 830 572		28,6	
Total	2001	14 195	-2,2	876136	61,7	29 577 575	21 182 479	3,6	29,6	3,5
Total	2002	13 766	-3,0	893282	64,9	28 612 913	20 375 334	5,2	31,2	5,4
Total	2003	13 606	-1,2	923428	67,9	28 357 454	20 389 411	4,6	32,6	4,5
Total	2004	13 760	1,1	973961	70,8	28 683 797	20 792 899	4,3	34,0	4,3
Total	2005	14 057	2,2	1006667	71,6	29 225 184	21 476 748	1,1	34,4	1,2
Total	2006	14 504	3,2	1068606	73,7	30 176 517	22 534 863	2,9	35,4	2,9
Total	2007	15 156	4,5	1144314	75,5	31 488 117	23 851 602	2,4	36,3	2,5
Total	2008	15 732	3,8	1192010	75,8	32 558 740	24 847 335	0,4	36,6	0,8
Total	2009	15 789	0,4	1228883	77,8	32 431 428	24 822 459	2,6	37,9	3,6

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Total	2010	15 370	-2,7	1271475	82,7	31 490 671	24 134 193	6,3	40,4	6,6
Total	2011	15 457	0,6	1335055	86,4	31 588 538	24 194 954	4,5	42,3	4,7
Total	2012	15 475	0,1	1357365	87,7	31 544 036	24 282 421	1,5	43,0	1,7
Total	2013	15 464	-0,1	1377371	89,1	31 465 038	24 310 031	1,6	43,8	1,9
Total	2014	15 731	1,7	1422372	90,4	32 112 035	24 929 256	1,5	44,3	1,1
Total	2015	15 970	1,5	1474585	92,3	32 722 676	25 436 508	2,1	45,1	1,8
A	2000	2 936		30517	10,4	5 293 861	446 092		5,8	
A	2001	2 718	0,93	33 021	12,2	5 344 988	435 122	1,17	6,2	1,07
A	2002	2 661	0,98	33 730	12,7	5 225 620	446 080	1,04	6,5	1,04
A	2003	2 506	0,94	34 792	13,9	4 977 383	442 150	1,10	7,0	1,08
A	2004	2 469	0,99	37 805	15,3	4 907 792	442 451	1,10	7,7	1,10
A	2005	2 427	0,98	37 200	15,3	4 806 090	427 477	1,00	7,7	1,00
A	2006	2 276	0,94	35 141	15,4	4 499 606	411 002	1,01	7,8	1,01
A	2007	2 219	0,97	36 702	16,5	4 323 540	424 702	1,07	8,5	1,09
A	2008	2 196	0,99	35 939	16,4	4 349 806	456 821	0,99	8,3	0,97
A	2009	2 095	0,95	39 799	19,0	4 132 503	417 557	1,16	9,6	1,17
A	2010	2 004	0,96	37 085	18,5	3 890 423	427 672	0,97	9,5	0,99
A	2011	1 995	1,00	37 857	19,0	3 900 580	433 913	1,03	9,7	1,02
A	2012	1 946	0,98	34 265	17,6	3 864 148	425 411	0,93	8,9	0,91
A	2013	1 853	0,95	37 377	20,2	3 737 829	437 564	1,15	10,0	1,13
A	2014	1 804	0,97	37 633	20,9	3 673 023	430 208	1,03	10,2	1,02
A	2015	1 842	1,02	34 449	18,7	3 779 107	422 986	0,90	9,1	0,89

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B-E	2000	3 538		178 226	50,4	7 252 335	6 683 202		24,6	
B-E	2001	3 373	0,95	175 672	52,1	7 247 465	6 754 143	1,03	24,2	0,99
B-E	2002	3 093	0,92	176 745	57,1	6 636 738	6 183 830	1,10	26,6	1,10
B-E	2003	3 090	1,00	191 970	62,1	6 635 570	6 168 588	1,09	28,9	1,09
B-E	2004	3 205	1,04	212 631	66,3	6 909 772	6 397 766	1,07	30,8	1,06
B-E	2005	3 314	1,03	221 363	66,8	7 150 528	6 636 792	1,01	31,0	1,01
B-E	2006	3 466	1,05	244 502	70,5	7 462 952	6 907 937	1,06	32,8	1,06
B-E	2007	3 634	1,05	271 485	74,7	7 804 507	7 276 749	1,06	34,8	1,06
B-E	2008	3 785	1,04	288 554	76,2	8 011 590	7 539 280	1,02	36,0	1,04
B-E	2009	3 607	0,95	289 419	80,2	7 578 910	7 117 821	1,05	38,2	1,06
B-E	2010	3 404	0,94	313 744	92,2	7 174 047	6 761 402	1,15	43,7	1,15
B-E	2011	3 459	1,02	338 494	97,9	7 231 251	6 835 952	1,06	46,8	1,07
B-E	2012	3 455	1,00	347 858	100,7	7 170 848	6 773 329	1,03	48,5	1,04
B-E	2013	3 537	1,02	350 852	99,2	7 342 125	6 887 342	0,99	47,8	0,99
B-E	2014	3 621	1,02	366 569	101,2	7 519 554	7 042 394	1,02	48,7	1,02
B-E	2015	3 676	1,02	380 368	103,5	7 658 661	7 174 271	1,02	49,7	1,02
C	2000	2 919		104 764	35,9	6 081 662	5 540 567		17,2	
C	2001	2 833	0,97	103 505	36,5	6 115 443	5 625 920	1,02	16,9	0,98
C	2002	2 575	0,91	106 049	41,2	5 548 072	5 099 451	1,13	19,1	1,13
C	2003	2 594	1,01	118 741	45,8	5 591 510	5 129 886	1,11	21,2	1,11
C	2004	2 673	1,03	134 845	50,5	5 793 221	5 300 242	1,10	23,3	1,10
C	2005	2 763	1,03	141 195	51,1	5 990 532	5 498 595	1,01	23,6	1,01

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C	2006	2 901	1,05	164 790	56,8	6 270 130	5 742 678	1,11	26,3	1,12
C	2007	3 069	1,06	188 179	61,3	6 614 662	6 120 154	1,08	28,4	1,08
C	2008	3 213	1,05	203 998	63,5	6 819 809	6 369 091	1,04	29,9	1,05
C	2009	3 044	0,95	206 685	67,9	6 405 807	5 958 095	1,07	32,3	1,08
C	2010	2 856	0,94	224 845	78,7	6 026 311	5 623 331	1,16	37,3	1,16
C	2011	2 892	1,01	242 562	83,9	6 054 698	5 669 987	1,07	40,1	1,07
C	2012	2 879	1,00	250 424	87,0	5 981 913	5 600 901	1,04	41,9	1,04
C	2013	2 941	1,02	251 461	85,5	6 126 609	5 688 195	0,98	41,0	0,98
C	2014	3 005	1,02	271 433	83,7	6 272 408	5 807 836	0,98	43,3	1,05
C	2015	3 094	1,03	290 344	93,9	6 451 891	5 990 261	1,12	45,0	1,04
F	2000	665	0,21	86 120	129,5	1 924 270	1 610 885		44,8	
F	2001	951	1,43	86 209	90,6	2 185 726	1 698 607	0,70	39,4	0,88
F	2002	845	0,89	80 202	94,9	1 939 242	1 493 407	1,05	41,4	1,05
F	2003	797	0,94	78 055	97,9	1 834 432	1 417 496	1,03	42,5	1,03
F	2004	797	1,00	78 828	98,9	1 847 663	1 458 101	1,01	42,7	1,00
F	2005	840	1,05	82 976	98,8	1 943 897	1 531 470	1,00	42,7	1,00
F	2006	915	1,09	88 736	98,8	2 139 284	1 677 368	1,00	41,5	0,97
F	2007	1 047	1,14	91 091	87,0	2 430 987	1 898 170	0,88	37,5	0,90
F	2008	1 212	1,16	93 401	77,0	2 775 655	2 182 570	0,89	33,7	0,90
F	2009	1 281	1,06	102 877	80,3	2 914 146	2 246 207	1,04	35,3	1,05
F	2010	1 221	0,95	107 950	88,4	2 753 918	2 081 596	1,10	39,2	1,11
F	2011	1 246	1,02	122 486	98,3	2 797 780	2 139 877	1,11	43,8	1,12

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F	2012	1 211	0,97	117 633	97,1	2 704 724	2 063 027	0,99	43,5	0,99
F	2013	1 144	0,94	111 703	97,6	2 538 525	1 893 052	1,01	44,0	1,01
F	2014	1 134	0,99	121 757	107,4	2 530 610	1 895 496	1,10	48,1	1,09
F	2015	1 156	1,02	129 551	112,0	2 560 268	1 961 526	1,04	50,6	1,05
G-I	2000	2 760		238 961	86,6	6 891 852	5 031 759		34,7	
G-I	2001	2 910	1,05	240 485	82,6	6 444 287	4 588 259	0,95	37,3	1,08
G-I	2002	2 837	0,98	246 362	86,8	6 304 530	4 457 537	1,05	39,1	1,05
G-I	2003	2 806	0,99	248 317	88,5	6 302 199	4 511 751	1,02	39,4	1,01
G-I	2004	2 926	1,04	255 513	87,3	6 542 682	4 813 884	0,99	39,1	0,99
G-I	2005	2 996	1,02	266 922	89,1	6 659 481	4 985 992	1,02	40,1	1,03
G-I	2006	3 123	1,04	284 362	91,1	6 929 404	5 216 459	1,02	41,0	1,02
G-I	2007	3 372	1,08	299 897	88,9	7 468 196	5 727 859	0,98	40,2	0,98
G-I	2008	3 514	1,04	306 680	87,3	7 676 375	5 903 039	0,98	40,0	0,99
G-I	2009	3 537	1,01	315 421	89,2	7 623 537	5 894 520	1,02	41,4	1,04
G-I	2010	3 470	0,98	327 182	94,3	7 475 389	5 756 157	1,06	43,8	1,06
G-I	2011	3 471	1,00	333 666	96,1	7 430 218	5 703 139	1,02	44,9	1,03
G-I	2012	3 495	1,01	347 318	99,4	7 410 688	5 752 649	1,03	46,9	1,04
G-I	2013	3 461	0,99	350 777	101,4	7 290 050	5 695 870	1,02	48,1	1,03
G-I	2014	3 539	1,02	349 395	98,7	7 465 137	5 905 526	0,97	46,8	0,97
G-I	2015	3 608	1,02	356 511	98,8	7 588 763	6 067 871		47,0	
J	2000	188		26 015	138,7	484 221	415 799		53,7	
J	2001	195	1,04	28 866	148,1	464 111	409 861	1,07	62,2	1,16

BARGAINING FOR PRODUCTIVITY

J	2002	197	1,01	32 965	167,6	454 386	389 309	1,13	72,5	1,17
J	2003	202	1,03	34 221	169,5	454 279	390 718	1,01	75,3	1,04
J	2004	218	1,08	39 685	182,1	473 178	396 965	1,07	83,9	1,11
J	2005	216	0,99	38 467	178,2	459 764	385 474	0,98	83,7	1,00
J	2006	253	1,17	40 374	200,0	538 765	460 502	1,12	74,9	0,90
J	2007	286	1,13	43 087	150,9	608 637	510 532	0,75	70,8	0,94
J	2008	297	0,02	47 137	158,9	627 566	509 841	1,05	75,1	1,06
J	2009	316	1,07	49 018	155,1	650 962	529 869	0,98	75,3	1,00
J	2010	300	0,95	49 571	165,4	608 535	506 813	1,07	81,5	1,08
J	2011	299	1,00	52 559	19,3	600 215	494 631	0,12	87,6	1,07
J	2012	315	1,06	57 748	183,1	643 364	527 650	9,47	89,8	1,03
J	2013	333	1,06	60 388	181,5	671 438	544 660	0,99	89,9	1,00
J	2014	360	1,08	64 394	178,8	723 957	585 846	0,99	88,9	0,99
J	2015	375	1,04	69 578	185,7	759 329	607 781	1,04	91,6	1,03
K	2000	247		35 023	142,1	590 716	497 996		59,3	
K	2001	251	1,02	35 518	141,5	533 955	468 694	1,00	66,5	1,12
K	2002	259	1,03	34 904	135,0	546 923	476 403	0,95	63,8	0,96
K	2003	256	0,99	37 271	145,6	539 140	464 615	1,08	69,1	1,08
K	2004	272	1,06	40 693	149,4	561 615	481 810	1,03	72,5	1,05
K	2005	295	1,08	44 052	149,5	609 912	535 015	1,00	72,2	1,00
K	2006	329	1,12	43 572	132,6	676 636	608 127	0,89	64,4	0,89
K	2007	363	1,10	57 801	159,1	743 672	664 031	1,20	77,7	1,21



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K	2008	342	0,94	57 895	169,5	699 914	608 365	1,07	82,7	1,06
K	2009	372	1,09	54 220	145,7	761 571	647 842	0,86	71,2	0,86
K	2010	353	0,95	52 684	149,4	717 936	621 184	1,03	73,4	1,03
K	2011	371	1,05	57 059	154,0	748 356	636 100	1,03	76,2	1,04
K	2012	393	1,06	51 413	131,0	795 075	689 161	0,85	64,7	0,85
K	2013	383	0,98	58 797	153,5	767 327	661 738	1,17	76,6	1,18
K	2014	378	0,99	64 456	170,3	762 896	650 081	1,11	84,5	1,10
K	2015	397	1,05	73 977	186,6	804 907	693 843	1,10	91,9	1,09
L	2000	183		57 069	312,7	308 174	286 574		185,2	
L	2001	158	0,87	55 566	351,2	275 184	253 921	1,12	201,9	1,09
L	2002	154	0,97	59 121	385,2	280 983	265 850	1,10	210,4	1,04
L	2003	145	0,94	60 829	420,4	276 878	258 035	1,09	219,7	1,04
L	2004	146	1,01	60 113	410,9	294 060	273 856	0,98	204,4	0,93
L	2005	136	0,93	60 976	448,4	268 217	247 264	1,09	212,7	1,04
L	2006	123	0,91	63 652	517,1	246 027	222 844	1,15	258,7	1,22
L	2007	129	1,05	63 259	491,1	257 093	234 152	0,95	246,1	0,95
L	2008	143	1,11	63 770	446,6	284 213	255 574	0,91	246,1	1,00
L	2009	156	1,09	63 547	407,4	311 727	273 373	0,91	203,9	0,83
L	2010	168	1,07	67 793	404,7	330 167	288 265	0,99	205,3	1,01
L	2011	164	0,98	70 670	430,1	326 027	284 489	1,06	216,8	1,06
L	2012	147	0,89	70 786	482,2	285 998	252 966	1,12	247,5	1,14
L	2013	143	0,97	71 268	499,1	271 854	242 061	1,04	262,2	1,06

BARGAINING FOR PRODUCTIVITY

L	2014	161	1,12	74 909	466,7	306 791	260 331	0,94	244,2	0,93
L	2015	173	1,07	72 801	422,0	337 207	289 860	0,90	215,9	0,88
M-N	2000	557		55 164	99,1	1 326 771	1 032 424		41,6	
M-N	2001	559	1,00	57 004	102,0	1 219 006	995 271	1,03	46,8	1,12
M-N	2002	577	1,03	56 539	97,9	1 247 460	973 883	0,96	45,3	0,97
M-N	2003	575	1,00	58 052	100,9	1 229 596	945 473	1,03	47,2	1,04
M-N	2004	609	1,06	61 175	100,5	1 286 543	984 760	1,00	47,6	1,01
M-N	2005	641	1,05	64 036	99,9	1 348 645	1 059 480	0,99	47,5	1,00
M-N	2006	670	1,04	68 871	102,9	1 410 931	1 108 796	1,03	48,8	1,03
M-N	2007	754	1,13	75 994	100,8	1 565 477	1 199 726	0,98	48,5	0,99
M-N	2008	778	1,03	84 093	108,1	1 598 884	1 213 633	1,07	52,6	1,08
M-N	2009	840	1,08	89 021	105,9	1 706 753	1 308 864	0,98	52,2	0,99
M-N	2010	872	1,04	89 338	102,5	1 783 443	1 369 509	0,97	50,1	0,96
M-N	2011	920	1,05	93 709	101,9	1 868 515	1 413 701	0,99	50,2	1,00
M-N	2012	939	1,02	98 276	104,7	1 904 018	1 451 228	1,03	51,6	1,03
M-N	2013	941	1,00	102 123	108,6	1 892 663	1 441 311	1,04	54,0	1,05
M-N	2014	1 012	1,08	106 647	105,4	2 049 869	1 535 931	0,97	52,0	0,96
M-N	2015	1 003	0,99	117 642	117,3	2 041 727	1 520 399	1,11	57,6	1,11
O-Q	2000	3 074		147 859	48,1	5 371 867	5 258 139		27,5	
O-Q	2001	2 734	0,89	155 380	56,8	5 126 963	5 032 775	1,18	30,3	1,10
O-Q	2002	2 781	1,02	161 760	58,2	5 226 313	5 131 785	1,02	31,0	1,02
O-Q	2003	2 850	1,02	166 891	58,6	5 340 774	5 224 465	1,01	31,2	1,01

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O-Q	2004	2 743	0,96	171 377	62,5	5 124 676	5 001 729	1,07	33,4	1,07
O-Q	2005	2 813	1,03	174 263	61,9	5 230 497	5 097 584	0,99	33,3	1,00
O-Q	2006	2 921	1,04	179 065	61,3	5 430 908	5 273 888	0,99	33,0	0,99
O-Q	2007	2 928	1,00	181 747	62,1	5 455 888	5 299 290	1,01	33,3	1,01
O-Q	2008	3 019	1,03	187 409	62,1	5 661 839	5 511 650	1,00	33,1	0,99
O-Q	2009	3 125	1,04	197 415	63,2	5 871 316	5 698 507	1,02	33,6	1,02
O-Q	2010	3 113	1,00	196 876	63,2	5 859 741	5 648 753	1,00	33,6	1,00
O-Q	2011	3 086	0,99	199 104	64,5	5 817 918	5 614 030	1,02	34,2	1,02
O-Q	2012	3 121	1,01	199 398	63,9	5 895 449	5 680 326	0,99	33,8	0,99
O-Q	2013	3 204	1,03	201 263	62,8	6 074 841	5 828 733	0,98	33,1	0,98
O-Q	2014	3 248	1,01	204 740	63,0	6 192 268	5 959 323	1,00	33,1	1,00
O-Q	2015	3 262	1,00	208 934	64,1	6 281 567	6 011 866		33,3	
R-U	2000	371		21 172	57,1	775 100	567 702	0,89	27,3	0,82
R-U	2001	346	0,93	21 118	61,0	735 891	545 825	1,07	28,7	1,05
R-U	2002	362	1,05	22 818	63,0	750 718	557 251	1,03	30,4	1,06
R-U	2003	381	1,05	22 731	59,7	767 203	566 120	0,95	29,6	0,97
R-U	2004	374	0,98	22 825	61,0	735 817	541 578	1,02	31,0	1,05
R-U	2005	380	1,01	23 469	61,8	748 154	570 202	1,01	31,4	1,01
R-U	2006	429	1,13	25 168	58,7	842 005	647 940	0,95	29,9	0,95
R-U	2007	425	0,99	26 583	62,5	830 121	616 391	1,06	32,0	1,07
R-U	2008	448	1,05	29 628	66,2	872 900	666 561	1,06	33,9	1,06
R-U	2009	460	1,03	30 176	65,7	880 002	687 899	0,99	34,3	1,01

BARGAINING FOR PRODUCTIVITY

R-U	2010	466	1,02	29 252	62,7	897 073	672 841	0,96	32,6	0,95
R-U	2011	447	0,96	29 451	65,9	867 679	639 124	1,05	33,9	1,04
R-U	2012	454	1,01	33 266	73,3	869 726	666 674	1,11	38,2	1,13
R-U	2013	466	1,03	32 130	68,9	878 384	677 700	0,94	36,6	0,96
R-U	2014	474	1,02	32 829	69,3	887 930	664 121	1,01	37,0	1,01
R-U	2015	479	1,01	33 129	69,2	911 142	686 105	1,00	36,4	0,98